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JAPANESE MARITIME THOUGHT: IF NOT MAHAN, WHO?
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes
The late Colonel John Boyd, who knew a thing or two about strategic thought,was fond of declaring that excellence in warfare and other human endeavors
depended on people, ideas, and hardware—in that order.1 We postulate that Japan
has lost sight of this commonsense axiom, allowing strategic thought to atrophy.
If so, this decline in strategic thought could impede Tokyo’s ability to act outside
the confines of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance—as it might need to, given
the rise of an increasingly capable, seapower-minded China and mounting fric-
tions between Beijing and Tokyo. We ask the following questions to assess the
state of strategic thinking in Japan’s naval forces:
• Why does maritime strategy matter now, in an increasingly interconnected
world? Does economic interdependence eliminate the resort to power politics?
• How did Alfred Thayer Mahan view seapower and its uses? How much
influence did Mahan exert in imperial Japan?
• How strictly did the Imperial Japanese Navy adhere to Mahan’s theories,
and, when it departed from Mahanian theory, why did it do so, and with
what impact?
• How much continuity was there in strategic thinking between the Imperial
Japanese Navy and the Maritime Self-Defense Force? What impact did any
shifts in strategic thought have?
• Which strategic theorists do Japanese naval officials consult when they are
grappling with vexing issues? If not Mahan, whom?
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• If indeed strategic thought has languished in postwar Japan’s maritime
forces, how might political and military leaders revive it? To which strategic
theorists should they look?
We close with a few observations and policy recommendations for Tokyo’s
naval establishment. Given the preliminary nature of this inquiry, we leave the
article somewhat open-ended, in hopes of starting a sorely needed debate in Jap-
anese and American naval circles rather than supplying answers that are likely to
be premature.
JAPAN, GEOGRAPHY, AND MARITIME STRATEGY
While it may no longer be fashionable to equate geography to destiny, Japan’s
physical position reaffirms this apparently quaint axiom. The concept of mari-
time power is inseparable from its spatial meaning. Maritime power is at its
most basic level concerned with a nation’s ability to exploit the sea—a physical,
nautical medium. The immutable geographic realities that Japan confronts
merit particular attention because they have shaped and will continue to shape
Japan’s interactions with its neighbors. Japan’s maritime posture, then, has al-
ways been and will always be intimately linked to geography. The Japanese often
describe their key national characteristic in nautical terms, with the familiar no-
tion that “Japan is a small island nation lacking resource endowments and is
thus highly dependent upon seaborne commerce for its well being.”Clearly, Tokyo
must always be mindful of the surrounding oceans.
Yet additional geographic features impinge upon Japan’s strategic and mar-
itime postures. It is natural to compare Great Britain and Japan, two insular
powers seaward of great continental landmasses.2 Japan stands considerably
off the Asian continent, with nearly a hundred miles separating Honshu Island
from the Korean Peninsula. By contrast, only twenty miles separate Britain
from continental Europe at the nearest point. Concentrated in a few pockets of
flat terrain on the east coast, major Japanese cities face outward toward the Pa-
cific rather than inward toward the continent. In effect they gaze out at the
United States, whereas Britain’s major population centers physically tend to
direct attention toward their European neighbors. Historically such demo-
graphic positioning has reinforced the isolation and insularity of Japan, while
Britain has interacted regularly with the rest of Europe. Japan’s distinctive geo-
graphic and demographic conformation conditions its strategic preferences,
pulling Tokyo in divergent directions: geographically, Japan is part of conti-
nental Asia, but demographically it inclines toward transpacific ties. Japan has
been ambivalent about whether it is (or wants to be) an Asian or a Western
power, whereas Britain has managed to craft a special relationship with the
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United States across the Atlantic while acting as a traditional offshore balancer
across the English Channel.3
Japanese geography carries strategic implications. The four main home islands
stretch 1,200 miles, roughly the entire north-south length of the U.S. eastern
seaboard. This archipelago, which extends along the Ryukyu Islands to the
south, forms a long crescent that hugs the eastern flanks of Russia and China,
Eurasia’s greatest land powers. Japan seemingly stands in the way of naval power
projection from the mainland.4 Chinese vessels exiting the East China Sea into
the Pacific must contend with the Ryukyus, while the Korean Peninsula, in effect
a half-island appended to Eurasia, thrusts out toward the Japanese archipelago
like the proverbial “dagger aimed at the heart of Japan.” These enduring geo-
graphic traits have been arbiters of interstate relations and wars among the four
powers for over a century.5
Finally, the physical defense of Japan requires credible nautical power projec-
tion. Tokyo is saddled with seventeen thousand miles of coastline to defend. By
comparison with the great powers, India’s shoreline is 4,600 miles long, while
China’s extends eleven thousand miles, America’s twelve thousand miles, and
Russia’s twenty-three thousand miles (primarily facing the empty Arctic). Lack-
ing strategic depth—the widest east-west length of Honshu is a mere 160
miles—Japanese planners must think in terms of defending forward at sea,
much as the Israelis do about land warfare.6 To complicate matters, Tokyo pos-
sesses thousands of offshore islands, with the farthest ones located near the
Tropic of Cancer. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF, or MSDF) de-
scribes the nation’s defense dilemma in vivid terms: if Wakkanai, the northern-
most city of Japan, is Copenhagen, then the Ishigaki, Okinotori, and Minamitori
islands are the equivalents of Casablanca, Tripoli, and Alexandria, respectively.7
In other words, Japan’s maritime defense area encompasses an area as large as
NATO-Europe, plus the entire Mediterranean.
Several implications flow from this geopolitical analysis. First, whereas conti-
nental powers have the option of venturing seaward or retreating from the
oceans, Japan enjoys no such luxury. The importance of a coherent strategic
framework for Japanese naval planners is hard to overstate. Second, and closely
related, Tokyo cannot avoid entanglement with immediate neighbors that har-
bor maritime ambitions of their own. Japan is located near enough to the Eur-
asian continent that it must be alert for any realignment or imbalance in regional
seapower. Third, if forced to defend its maritime interests by itself, Tokyo would
not be able to ignore pressures to build up a maritime force far larger and more
capable than its current modestly sized, if world-class, fleet. If Tokyo succumbed
to these pressures, its actions would almost certainly bring about countervailing
actions from its neighbors.
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The bottom line: the direction and quality of Japanese strategic thinking
about nautical affairs will have ripple effects on the international relations of
East Asia and therefore bear careful examination. The following thus charts
trends in Japanese maritime thinking from the prewar era to the twenty-first
century and ventures some policy recommendations.
MAHAN’S SEAPOWER EVANGELISM
A century ago Japanese maritime thinkers, facing similar challenges, looked to
America for guidance on seapower. Writing around the turn of the nineteenth
century, Alfred Thayer Mahan exhorted an America long disdainful toward for-
eign political entanglements to amass a kind of “sea power” built on the “three
pillars” of overseas commerce, naval and merchant fleets, and naval bases ar-
rayed along the sea lanes to support fuel-thirsty warships.8 While there was a cir-
cular quality to his theorizing—the navy protected a nation’s trade, which in
turn generated tariff revenue to support the navy—the commercial element of
seapower seemed to be uppermost in his thinking. Mahan’s self-perpetuating
logic beguiled advocates of seapower in his day, and it has a timeless quality.9 In
today’s China, which aspires to its own place in the sun, appeals to Mahanian
theory are increasingly commonplace.10
If there were any geographic bounds to Mahan’s vision of seapower, he did
not say so. While his writings were appropriate to Great Britain or the United
States, maritime nations with far-flung aspirations, they held only limited rele-
vance for a fledgling power such as imperial Japan, whose aspirations were con-
fined to regional waters and coastal areas. Where should an America rethinking
political nonentanglement apply its nautical energies? In East Asia: for Mahan,
seapower would assure the United States an equitable share of trade in China, a
“carcass” doomed to be devoured by “eagles,” namely the great imperial powers.11
If the United States failed to defend its share of the China trade—Mahanian
thought had a strongly zero-sum tenor to it—it would lose out, with dire conse-
quences for the nation’s prosperity.12 Although he claimed to deplore the pros-
pect of great-power war, Mahan seemed resigned to it if a rival injected “the
alien element of military or political force” into peaceful seagoing commerce.13
Both merchant shipping and the U.S. Navy thus needed secure communica-
tions with East Asia. Communications, wrote Mahan, was “the most important
single element in strategy, political or military.”14 The “eminence of sea power”
lay in its ability to control the sea lines of communication, while the power “to
insure these communications to one’s self, and to interrupt them for an adver-
sary, affects the very root of a nation’s vigor.”15 Perhaps his central precept—and
a staple of discourse in contemporary China—was his concept of “command of
the sea” as “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from
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it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great
common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and fro from the en-
emy’s shores.”16 If the United States hoped to assure access to overseas markets,
proclaimed Mahan, its navy must construct forces able to “fight, with reasonable
chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it” in regions vi-
tal to American maritime traffic.17 This ability to impose a local preponderance
of naval force was the hub of a prosperity-minded policy of seapower.
To “maximize the power of offensive action,” which was “the great end of a
war fleet,” the United States needed a modest force of twenty armored battle-
ships “capable of taking and giving hard knocks” in a major fleet engagement.18
Mahan disparaged guerre de course, or commerce raiding, as the strategy of the
weaker power, hopeless in the face of a navy able to exercise overbearing
seapower. His followers instead sought titanic clashes between concentrated
fleets of battleships—in other words, a latter-day equivalent to Trafalgar.19
THE INFLUENCE OF MAHAN UPON JAPAN
Scholars agree that Japanese strategists leapt at Mahan’s theories. Mahan re-
called that his works had been more widely translated into Japanese than any
other language.20 In 1902, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei paid tribute to Mahan’s
analytical skills, offering him a teaching post at Japan’s Naval Staff College.21 De-
clared Captain John Ingles, a British officer who taught at the Naval Staff College
for six years, “Japanese naval officers are much impressed with the advantage in
a land war of superiority at sea. They have been, I think, faithful students of the
American naval historian, Captain Mahan.”22
But the exact nature of Mahan’s influence on the Japanese naval establish-
ment is a matter of some dispute. One view, seemingly predominant among
contemporary scholars, draws a straight line between Mahanian precepts and
prewar Japanese ideas about seapower. Ronald Spector describes the Japanese as
“true disciples of Mahan.”23 Peter Woolley notes that “Japan took Mahan quite
seriously. His books were carefully studied. His proclamation that navies were
strategically dominant in the modern world was strongly embraced.”24 Richard
Turk affirms that the Imperial Japanese Navy, or IJN, imbibed Mahanian
seapower theory “in purer form” than did any other navy.25 Clearly, a sizable
body of scholarship accepts the notion that Alfred Thayer Mahan lent Japanese
naval strategy its founding precepts and doctrine.26
Other scholars take a more skeptical, more variegated view of the Mahan-Japan
relationship. While Mahan earned acclaim from powerful naval leaders in Japan,
in this account, he was far from the only influence on them. Both Akiyama
Saneyuki and Sat Tetsutar—the former commonly known as the “father of
Japanese naval strategy,” the latter as “Japan’s Mahan”—drew intellectual
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inspiration from many sources, ranging from ancient Japanese “water force”
tactics to the writings of the Chinese theorist Sun Tzu. Sat spent six months
studying naval strategy in the United States, but this came on the heels of eigh-
teen months’ study in Great Britain, which after all was the world’s leading naval
power and the model for aspirants to maritime preeminence.27
Japanese strategists read Mahan’s works selectively, moreover, using his ideas to
ratify preconceived ideas about how Japan should configure and use its navy. Even
in the United States, some analysts have intimated, in a similar vein, that Mahan
was more a propagandist than a perceptive strategic theorist. One, Margaret Tuttle
Sprout, dubbed him an “evangelist of sea power.”28 Roger Dingman, a leading
skeptic, questions the extent of Mahan’s sway over the Japanese naval establish-
ment: “I am skeptical of these claims about Mahan’s influence across the Pacific
for several reasons. They are, in the first place, little more than claims, unsup-
ported by any substantial body of evidence.”29 Continues Dingman:
To suggest that Mahan the publicist of seapower was a tool of potentially great power
to Japanese naval expansionists . . . is not to argue that he was in any sense the cause
of their actions. . . . While they invoked his ideas and used his language in the wake
of the Sino-Japanese War to justify fleet expansion, it was that conflict—and the
prospect of another with Imperial Russia—that provided the much more basic sense
of threat that yielded affirmative Diet votes for a bigger navy.30
Conclude Dingman and like-minded analysts, Mahan was only part of a
mélange of influences on Japanese naval thinkers. Japanese officials welcomed
his emphasis on command of the sea, which seemed to reaffirm their experi-
ences from wars with China and Russia, but they also used him freely to advance
the IJN’s parochial aims.
If Mahan was only one among many intellectual influences on the IJN,
seapower theory was only one among many political, bureaucratic, economic,
and social factors that shaped the thinking of Japanese naval strategists. Notes
one historian, the navy’s rise resulted in great part from an “interplay between
power, pageantry, politics, propaganda, and nationalism.” Naval leaders “signifi-
cantly altered politics, empire, and society in pursuit of their narrower and more
parochial concerns, namely larger budgets.” “Politics,” he concludes, “was the
lifeblood of the Japanese navy, as it was for the navies of Germany, the United
States, and Britain in the same historical period.”31 Mahan made a useful ally for
IJN leaders, helping them rally public support for an ambitious naval pro-
gram—just as he made a useful ally to Theodore Roosevelt and his cohort of
American navalists or, for that matter, to Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in his tilts
with socialists in the Reichstag.
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Since the inception of the IJN, moreover, naval leaders had waged a bitter bu-
reaucratic struggle with the Japanese army for preeminence in the eyes of the
government and the populace. Bureaucratic politics tended to deflect Japanese
naval strategy from the Mahanian trajectory it would have followed had the IJN
abided purely by Mahanian precepts. For the Japanese navy of the mid-1890s,
flush with victory over China, “the problem of grand strategy was more than a
topic of theoretical discussion at the Naval Staff College. . . . [T]he navy . . .
pressed for status beyond interservice parity, toward a position of seniority from
which it could set the nation’s strategic priorities and claim the lion’s share of
national prestige, public acclaim, and most important, the government’s mili-
tary budget.”32
To gain this senior position and the funding and prestige it would bring, IJN
leaders realized they needed “a carefully elaborated statement of the preeminent
importance of seapower, an argument backed by the weight of historical exam-
ple, taken not just from Japan’s own past, but also from the far greater experience
of the traditional maritime powers of the West.” In short, they set out to propa-
gate a “public credo” as much as a rational maritime strategy.33 From the West-
ern maritime tradition, the peculiarities of Japan’s geopolitical situation, and
the IJN’s parochial needs, they fashioned a “blue water” school of strategic
thought about the sea.
IMPERIAL JAPAN’S QUASI-MAHANIAN NAVAL STRATEGY
As it took shape, then, Japanese naval strategy bore only partial resemblance to
the seapower-minded strategy Alfred Thayer Mahan espoused. To be sure, lead-
ing IJN thinkers such as Akiyama, Suzuki Kantar, and Sat—who served to-
gether at the Naval Staff College in 1910–11, imparting their vision of Japanese
seapower to the World War II generation of naval officers—accepted Mahan’s
general advocacy of dominant seapower.34 Sat, note David Evans and Mark
Peattie, “seems to have fallen under the spell of Mahan’s navalism in its most
global sense,” namely “command of the seas as the projection of naval power
abroad and thus the means to national greatness.”35 Like Mahan, he accentuated
the connection among naval strength, maritime trade, and world power, predi-
cating his own seapower advocacy on riko o sake, umi o susumu (avoiding the
continent and advancing on the seas). This beckoned naval leaders’ attention to-
ward Southeast Asia.36 This southerly, seafaring outlook on regional strategy
stood in stark contrast to the prescriptions issuing forth from the Japanese army,
which had cast its gaze westward, on the Asian landmass.
In his treatise On the History of Imperial Defense (1908) and other works, Sat
both confirmed the priorities of the Japanese navy, which had been forged in
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victories over the Chinese and Russian navies, and sculpted these priorities in
line with his own meditations on history and theory. He accepted the Mahanian
notion that assured communications was the sine qua non of great maritime
power and that the way to assure communications was to build a battle fleet ca-
pable of sweeping the enemy’s flag from vital waterways. From the battle of
Tsushima, as well as from his study of Mahan, he concluded that the single, deci-
sive fleet engagement was the arbiter of dominant seapower. Further, he clearly
fell into the “big ship, big gun” camp that represented the mainstream of Japa-
nese naval thought in the decades leading up to the Pacific War.37 Japan did opt
for a Mahanian battle fleet, planning for a climactic fleet engagement with the
“hypothetical enemy” Sat Tetsutar envisioned—the U.S. Navy.38
But, as Dingman and other scholars aver, Sat and like-minded Japanese
navalists adapted Mahanian seapower theory to Japan’s distinctive geography
and political and economic imperatives. How, and why, did they depart from
Mahanian precepts? Several factors were in play. First, Mahan had identified six
“principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations”: geographical position;
physical conformation, including climate and “natural productions”; extent of
territory; number of population; character of the people; and character of the
government and national institutions.39 These indices of powerful seafaring na-
tions guided Japan in a different direction from that of the United States, or even
of Great Britain—to which, by virtue of its insular conformation and its geo-
graphic position on the Asian periphery, Japan bore the greatest resemblance.
IJN thinkers recognized that Japan was a regional power with limited re-
sources, whereas Mahan had derived his theories from the example of Britain,
the world’s leading sea power, which had interests and commitments ringing the
world. They also recognized that their government and people saw the nation
not as a sea power in the British sense but as a land power that had wrested away
territorial holdings on the nearby Asian landmass and thus had certain interests
at sea. Navy leaders were forced to wage a lively debate with their army counter-
parts, lobbying for a maritime-oriented foreign policy and strategy. Army lead-
ers argued that the IJN should content itself with defending the Japanese
homeland against attack. Navy leaders pointed to the importance of the sea lines
of communication connecting Japan to vital foreign resources and markets.
They also questioned how the army planned to support expeditionary forces in
Asia absent secure communications with the home islands. Secure sea communi-
cations, upheld by the IJN, were crucial to even the army’s land-oriented vision.40
Naval leaders thus crafted a modified Mahanian naval strategy that was local
and particularistic. They paid little attention to island bases, one of Mahan’s
“pillars” of global seapower, accepting the reality of large-scale territorial con-
quests in nearby Korea, Manchuria, and coastal China. Akiyama, Suzuki, and
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Sat did turn their attentions toward Southeast Asia as they applied Mahanian
precepts to Japanese conditions. But it was not until the 1930s, when the IJN
converted its warships from coal- to oil-fired propulsion, that their case for “ad-
vancing on the seas” in a southerly direction took on real urgency in terms of the
national interest.41 Japanese thinkers realized that the “southern strategy” they
contemplated would likely bring Japan in conflict with the European imperial
powers, which held most of Southeast Asia, and ultimately with the United
States. In the interwar period, accordingly, the IJN devised a strategy aimed at
luring the U.S. Navy across the broad Pacific to a Mahanian fleet engagement,
where it would reprise the battle of Tsushima.42
Second, Japanese mariners were a product of their bureaucratic environment
and their operational experiences, which primed them to look at seapower dif-
ferently than had Mahan, the seapower historian and prophet. Sat and his fel-
low navalists were practitioners, serving in numerous sea billets, whereas the
academically inclined Mahan had seen only scant sea duty and had possessed lit-
tle taste for more. (“I am the man of thought, not the man of action,” confessed
Mahan on one occasion, venturing an explanation as to why his perspective dif-
fered from that of Theodore Roosevelt, by any definition a man of action.)43
They also understood that their immediate task was to win ascendance over the
army in the services’ perennial turf war. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto Gombei
rushed Sat’s On the History of Imperial Defense into print to help the navy make
its case for bigger budgets and more ships.44 These priorities help explain why
Japanese navalists’ ideas diverged from those set forth by Mahan, who, comfort-
ably ensconced in Newport, Rhode Island, was largely spared these everyday tra-
vails of navy life.
Japanese strategists focused primarily on tactics and operations rather than
the more rarefied dimensions of naval warfare, in large part because, in contrast
to their American counterparts, they learned about naval strategy more from
combat experience than from abstract seapower theory. Observes Dingman,
leading Japanese theorists were combat veterans of the Sino-Japanese and
Russo-Japanese wars. Thus “they turned more to their own empire’s recent his-
tory than to the more distant past as Mahan had,” and their “pens were mobi-
lized more to support specific building programs than to elucidate general
principles.”45 Their proposals were geared to big ships and big guns. Says
Spector, “Japanese admirals were too faithful students of Mahan to put their
faith for ultimate victory in any weapon except the battleship.”46
Tactics and even hardware, then, propelled Japanese naval thought at least as
much as did the ideal relationship among strategic theory, naval strategy, and
force structure. In effect the IJN inverted this relationship, fitting seapower the-
ory around its immediate needs for ships, budgets, and bureaucratic supremacy.
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JAPAN’S POSTWAR MARITIME POSTURE
“One searches the pages of recent histories of the Imperial Japanese Navy in vain
for any mention of Alfred Thayer Mahan,” declares Roger Dingman.47 Just so.
Written to commemorate the centennial of the Russo-Japanese War, a recent
Naval War College Review article by Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, a senior JSMDF
officer, is nearly mute on Mahan.48 Interviews with retired officers from the
Maritime Self-Defense Force likewise imply that Mahan is missing from Japa-
nese strategic thought today. Indeed, the MSDF has seemingly allowed strategic
thought to languish entirely, owing primarily to Japan’s close alliance with the
United States. Asked to describe the sources of Japanese seapower thinking,
these officers invariably call for reinforcing the alliance with the United States
and its navy.49 While joining in a composite maritime force with the U.S. Navy
confers undoubted benefits on the MSDF—giving the service the offensive
punch it lacks as a matter of policy and law—Japan’s dependence on its super-
power partner clearly has marked drawbacks.
The demise of the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1945 did not end naval planning
for Tokyo, even if it did discredit Alfred Thayer Mahan and other thinkers; it
simply starved Japanese naval planning of intellectual sustenance. Former IJN
officers soon began rebuilding the nation’s maritime forces with full approval
and oversight from the American occupation authorities. Indeed, even before
the formal surrender ceremonies on board the Missouri, the United States or-
dered Japan to clear heavily mined areas along the Japanese coast.50 The ad hoc
flotilla of minesweepers formed for this purpose, using remnants of the imperial
navy, became the nucleus for postwar Japanese naval power.51
It quickly became clear that a functioning institution was required to safe-
guard Japan’s basic maritime interests. In 1948, accordingly, the Japanese gov-
ernment established the Maritime Safety Agency, the precursor to the Maritime
Self-Defense Force. The Korean War induced U.S. defense planners to seek Japa-
nese military assistance. Unbeknownst to the outside world, Japanese mine-
sweepers were deployed to combat zones off the Korean Peninsula under
American operational command, performing a critical support function that
the U.S. Seventh Fleet lacked.52 Postwar Japan, then, devised a navy only in re-
sponse to the demands of its occupiers. Strategic thinking about naval opera-
tions independent of the United States was absent from the start.
Following the full restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1952, Tokyo rapidly
expanded its maritime responsibilities. Strikingly, the 1952 U.S.-Japan defense
treaty signed at San Francisco made the security of the Far East—implicitly in-
cluding Japan’s maritime environs—a key area of responsibility for the alliance.
But the broad geographic scope of the alliance had less to do with Japan’s intrin-
sic needs than with America’s emerging containment strategy in Asia.53
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Four years after the MSDF entered service in 1954, the Japan Defense Agency
(JDA) unveiled its first formal defense buildup plan (1958–60), which set forth
three central tasks for Japan’s maritime defense. First, submarines were deemed
the most pressing threat; accordingly, the MSDF’s primary mission was to con-
duct antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations in waters adjacent to the Japa-
nese archipelago.54 A second, equally urgent mission was to protect the sea lines
of communication (SLOCs). Third, the MSDF needed to defend against a direct
invasion from the sea. These three pillars informed subsequent four-year plans
and still form the basis for Japan’s maritime defense posture. Renewed attention
to SLOC defense may or may not have reflected thinking inherited from Japan’s
prewar strategic traditions, but there was little sign that Tokyo thought about
seapower in rigorous theoretical terms. Wartime defeat had banished Mahan
from the Japanese lexicon, and no one had taken his place.
An intriguing episode during this period illustrates Japan’s early naval ambi-
tions in the Cold War.55 In 1960, as a part of the regular revision and update of
the first defense plan, the MSDF floated a proposal to acquire a helicopter carrier
for ASW operations. The initial plan for a six-thousand-ton vessel was revised
upward, calling for an eleven-thousand-ton ship capable of carrying up to eigh-
teen helicopters. Such a project, if executed, would have represented a quantum
leap in the tonnage and capability of Japan’s nascent postwar fleet. Notably, the
Japanese cited American requests for sea-based helicopter support during the
Korean War as precedent for a carrier acquisition. (In 1953 the United States had
offered to lease Tokyo a seven-thousand-ton escort carrier to track Soviet sub-
marines, while Tokyo considered converting a transport ship into a carrier.)
Japanese aversion to military matters, amplified by bureaucratic politics, ulti-
mately nullified the MSDF’s bid for a carrier, but its ambitions along these lines
endured. It crafted a fleet centered on helicopter-carrying destroyers, in an effort
to sidestep political objections to aircraft carriers. The service eventually got its
wish three decades later (discussed below). A carrier of that capacity would have
substantially bolstered Japan’s ASW capacity, but in these early days the MSDF
clearly ignored the political climate, budgetary realities, and, most importantly,
the proposed vessel’s place in Japan’s long-term maritime strategy. The MSDF’s
tendency to covet the latest in naval technology without reference to a broader
naval strategy or Japan’s political needs persists to this day.
Geopolitical events and domestic debates reinforced the MSDF’s central role
in securing the nation’s welfare. The 1960 revision of the U.S.-Japan security
treaty added a “Far East clause” that more explicitly codified the need to protect
Japan’s nautical environment while widening allied cooperation to the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines. To ease strategic pressures on a
nation weary from Vietnam, President Richard Nixon promulgated the “Guam
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Doctrine,” calling on U.S. allies to shoulder responsibilities in proportion to
their needs and capabilities. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato
declared publicly that Korea and Taiwan were areas of security concern for Ja-
pan. Response to a cross-strait contingency would have required the MSDF to
project forces far beyond the Japanese home islands.56 Again, both the Far East
and Taiwan clauses served America’s strategic interests in Asia rhetorically, but
they supplied no concrete guidance on how to harness Japan’s naval strategy and
capabilities for contingencies beyond defense of the home islands.
As Japan agreed in principle to take on greater responsibilities, this mismatch
in policy and strategy stood in ever sharper relief, until it became impossible to
overlook. As a consequence, genuine debate about the nation’s maritime priori-
ties emerged. Despite politicians’ declarations that Japan had acquired capabili-
ties adequate to defend its maritime interests by the early 1970s, the force
structure continued to exhibit serious deficiencies.57 Recognizing this misalign-
ment between political ends and naval means, Osamu Kaihara, a secretary gen-
eral of the National Defense Council, argued that Japan should dramatically
scale back its maritime posture, setting limited objectives that the MSDF could
realistically achieve. Japan’s SLOCs could be cut at countless points on the map,
he argued; protecting far-flung sea lanes exceeded Japan’s maritime capacity.
Kaihara urged Tokyo to restructure the JMSDF to resemble a coast guard geared
exclusively to defending the home islands from a direct invasion.
In contrast, Hideo Sekino, a respected commentator on defense affairs, con-
sidered a direct Soviet invasion unlikely. Given Japan’s dependence on overseas
resources, the nation was most vulnerable to commerce raiding in a conflict. The
1973 Arab oil embargo lent credence to Sekino’s basic premise and to his recom-
mendation that Tokyo procure the wherewithal to defend sea lanes as far away as
northern Indonesia. Sekino insisted that such a posture would be fully compati-
ble with American regional strategy in Asia, enabling Japan to influence events
within the alliance.58 Interestingly, the most persuasive aspect of Sekino’s argu-
ment was his claim that Japan could best support U.S. strategic interests in Asia
by heeding his recommendations.
Broader geopolitical alignments quickly overtook events. U.S.-Soviet détente
and Nixon’s dramatic opening to China in the early 1970s fed Japanese fears that
Washington was preparing to abandon the alliance. In response, the Japanese
government issued its first comprehensive report on how the force it envi-
sioned—based on a “standard defense force concept”—would meet Tokyo’s na-
tional security objectives. Strikingly, it took Japan nearly a quarter of a century
to address the most basic responsibility of any nation: matching national policy
with a coherent strategy and supporting forces. But little serious thought went
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into the report. If Japanese officials ever revisited their basic assumptions, the
document betrayed little sign of it.
In keeping with the maritime priorities established more than two decades
before, the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) provided guide-
lines for the MSDF to defend against a direct invasion of the home islands; pro-
vide warning and defense against threats to Japan’s coastal areas; protect major
ports and straits; and conduct active air reconnaissance and surveillance of the
seas adjacent to Japan’s Pacific coast (out to three hundred miles) and in the
Sea of Japan (perhaps one to two hundred miles from Japan’s west coast).59
The NDPO’s directives envisioned a fleet centering on modern destroyers,
submarines, and fixed- and rotary-wing ASW aircraft. Two years later, Tokyo
and Washington signed Guidelines for Defense Cooperation that formally com-
mitted Japan to maintaining “peace and stability” across the Asia-Pacific region.
The expansiveness of the outline and the guidelines sealed the ascendance of
Sekino’s vision, emphasizing the complementary role Japan could play in Amer-
ican security strategy.
By the 1980s, the revival of Cold War competition and a convergence of Japa-
nese and U.S. strategic interests had given rise to unprecedented naval coopera-
tion. In 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki sketched a Japanese defense perimeter
extending a thousand miles from Japanese shores.60 Two years later a U.S.-
Japanese study group examined the potential for combined operations to defend
SLOCs against the Soviets. For the rest of the decade, American and Japanese na-
val forces perfected the art of combined ASW, working to bottle up Soviet sub-
marine forces in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. During this period the MSDF
matured into a genuine partner of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific theater. By the end
of the Cold War, the JMSDF was second only to the United States in Asian waters.
Whatever its benefits, closer allied collaboration held serious risks for Japan.
According to one study, “The SDF’s emphasis on the procurement of interceptor
aircraft and antisubmarine warfare ships designed to complement and defend
U.S. offensive military assets operating from Japan meant that the structure of
its defense force became highly skewed, to the point that it lacked the balanced
range of capabilities necessary to defend Japan independent of the United
States.”61 Any prudent theorist of naval affairs would have frowned upon this ap-
parent shortsightedness—especially in a nation whose destiny lay on the seas.
Several patterns emerge from this brief survey of MSDF history. First, the Jap-
anese took to heart the bitter lessons of World War II, when the IJN’s failure to
defend commercial shipping against U.S. submarines led to disaster for the war-
time Japanese economy. Tokyo’s near-obsessive focus on sea-lane defense during
the Cold War stemmed in part from its desire to avoid a replay of these events.
Second, major historical events, namely the Korean War and the broader Cold
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War, seemed to underscore the importance of defending the sea lanes. From the
start, Japanese planners focused on antisubmarine and antimine warfare, and
subsequent strategy making deviated little from these central missions. Third,
Tokyo’s rigid adherence to the ill-defined mission of SLOC defense left the
MSDF’s capabilities lagging far behind its ambitious maritime vision. The ensu-
ing policy-strategy mismatch would not be repaired until the 1980s.
Fourth, preparations for SLOC defense served the allies’ needs asymmetri-
cally. The MSDF’s primary tasks filled serious gaps in American ASW and
mine-warfare capability while dovetailing fully with the U.S. strategy of contain-
ing Soviet naval power. Tokyo was able to exercise greater influence within the
alliance, as the founders of postwar Japan had hoped, but their grand bargain
entailed serious risks that persist today. Japanese naval strategy was always sub-
ordinate to the U.S. regional posture in Asia. It is no exaggeration to observe that
the MSDF lacked an independent identity, becoming a mere appendage of the
U.S. military. The American imprint on the Japanese navy is unmistakable. In-
deed, Japanese naval officers revere Admiral Arleigh Burke, not one of their own,
as “the father of the JMSDF.”62 But Japan’s heavy reliance on American concepts,
doctrine, and equipment amounted to intellectual buck-passing.
Finally, postwar Japan is a case study in the pitfalls of strategy making with-
out a larger theoretical framework. Policy documents set forth hazily defined
notions of regional peace and stability, while service-level directives focus over-
whelmingly on operations (sea-lane defense), tactics, and equipment. The tissue
that binds strategy to national policy is tenuous, if indeed it exists. Imperial Ja-
pan’s derivative of Mahanian strategic theory clearly did not outlive World War
II. Nor do Japanese planners refer explicitly to Sir Julian Corbett’s theories,
which were predicated almost exclusively on controlling sea communications,
even though the menace of guerre de course transfixed Japanese naval officials.63
THE POST–COLD WAR ERA AND BEYOND: THE MSDF DIVERSIFIES
The security environment grew more and more complex in the post–Cold War
epoch, even as domestic and international constituencies prodded Japan to step
up its efforts to maintain peace and stability, commensurate with its economic
power. The MSDF saw its roles and missions grow accordingly, performing tasks
well beyond homeland and sea-lane defense.64 Whether this diversification will
impel the MSDF to transform itself into a service with all the trappings of a tra-
ditional navy remains to be seen.
Japan got off to a rough start as the superpower rivalry neared its end. During
the 1990–91 Gulf War, Tokyo’s failure to provide meaningful military assistance
provoked accusations, both domestically and abroad, that Tokyo had indulged
in free-riding and “checkbook diplomacy.” Notably, however, the MSDF ended
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up playing a critical, path-breaking role, partly reversing the harsh international
verdict. The minesweeping force Japan deployed to the Persian Gulf after hostili-
ties had ceased boasted state-of-the-art equipment, and the MSDF discharged
its mission. Harking back to the Korean War, Japanese forces again performed
functions that outstripped U.S. Navy capabilities in-theater.
Determined not to suffer another public-relations disaster, the Japanese Diet
passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, easing restrictions on
overseas deployments of Japanese units. The legislation marked the beginning
of unprecedented international activism. Starting in 1992, the MSDF took part
in numerous relief and peacekeeping operations. Its first such effort involved trans-
porting personnel and equipment to Cambodia for a United Nations–mandated
peacekeeping mission. The carrier-like Osumi-class transport vessels (LST, or
landing ship tank) debuted during the 1999 East Timor crisis, arousing suspi-
cions in some quarters that Japan was taking its first step to enhance power pro-
jection. Tokyo’s embrace of international operations was only the beginning of
the MSDF’s expansion in the nautical arena.
Throughout the 1990s, Japan sought to organize regional initiatives to com-
bat piracy in Southeast Asia. As early as 1997, the National Institute for Defense
Studies, the JDA’s in-house think tank, proposed an ambitious security enter-
prise dubbed “Ocean Peace Keeping” (OPK). The OPK concept envisioned a
standing maritime security force composed of naval contingents from nearby
states. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi formally proposed a regional coast guard at
the 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit. While Obuchi’s proposal failed to catch on due to
its perceived radical nature, successive prime ministers lobbied for the OPK ini-
tiative in regional forums.65 When OPK faltered, the Japanese government
pressed for bilateral cooperation, including combined exercises and aid. Tokyo
achieved considerable success with this more modest approach, forging agree-
ments with littoral states such as Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Thailand.66
The 11 September terrorist attacks created new incentives for Japan to ex-
pand its maritime missions. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pushed legisla-
tion through the Diet permitting the Self-Defense Forces to provide rear-area
military support to allied forces operating in the Indian Ocean. The MSDF dis-
patched combat logistics ships, transports, and escorts on a rotating basis. No-
tably, the MSDF’s responsibilities and capabilities gradually grew. Its refueling
mission, initially limited to U.S. and British vessels, came to include eight other
coalition partners, with Japan meeting some 30 percent of allied fuel demand.67
As of September 2005, Japanese oilers had dispensed some 410 million liters
of fuel, worth $140 million, free of charge. 68 In December 2002, after some
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prodding from the United States, Japan reluctantly agreed to deploy a frontline
Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean.69
Japan assumed an assertive stance before and after the 2003 Iraq war. While
many Japanese politicians and most citizens questioned the legitimacy of the in-
vasion, Koizumi stood firmly behind the George W. Bush administration’s claim
that Iraq was a central front in the global war on terror. After the Diet enacted
the necessary legislation, Tokyo dispatched six hundred ground troops to
Samawah, a city considered secure, in a noncombat role. The MSDF employed
its Osumi-class ships to support this mission.
Also in 2003, as part of its broad-based support for the U.S.-led war on terror,
Tokyo acceded to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in an effort to halt
the proliferation of weapons technology at sea, aloft, and ashore.70 A “core” par-
ticipant in the PSI, Japan has taken part in a series of highly visible exercises held
across the globe. Because Japanese law forbade the MSDF to board ships in
peacetime, MSDF observers watched the Japanese Coast Guard during the first
round of multinational exercises. To correct this awkward arrangement, one of
the “war contingency bills” approved by the Diet in May 2004 loosened restric-
tions on the MSDF. In October 2004 Japan hosted its first PSI exercise, TEAM
SAMURAI, but the MSDF was still limited to patrol and intelligence operations. It
dispatched a destroyer, two P-3C surveillance aircraft, and two helicopters to the
first PSI drill in Southeast Asia, which Singapore hosted in August 2005.
Humanitarian imperatives also raised the profile of the MSDF. In January
2005, Japan undertook its largest postwar military deployment, sending MSDF
units to Indonesia in response to the devastating December 2004 tsunami.
Numbering approximately one thousand personnel, the relief task force in-
cluded three ships, five helicopters, and two C-130 transport aircraft. The MSDF
dispatched an Osumi-class transport ship, along with a refueling vessel and an
escort destroyer, to support helicopter operations off the coast of Aceh.71 Tokyo
called on a naval flotilla returning from patrols in the Indian Ocean to furnish
additional assistance.72 The mission, in which Japanese forces worked from an
integrated command post in Thailand, represented the first time the three
Self-Defense Force (SDF) services had operated jointly.
Tokyo’s most recent reassessment of its defense policy and military modern-
ization programs conforms to its activism over the past five years. The National
Defense Program Guidelines issued in December 2004 reaffirmed Japan’s varie-
gated security posture, instructing the SDF to prepare for “new threats and di-
verse situations” and for any international operations that might arise.73 The
NDPG mandates the capacity to defend against ballistic-missile attacks, respond
to incursions by enemy special-operations forces, defeat an invasion of Japan’s
offshore islands, patrol and prevent intrusion into Japan’s surrounding seas and
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airspace, and manage the effects of weapons-of-mass-destruction attacks. The
JMSDF has an ambitious slate of missions.
Accordingly, the latest Mid-Term Defense Program, which sets out
force-structure priorities to meet the NDPG’s directives, forecasts sizable pro-
curements of destroyers, submarines, and fixed- and rotary-wing patrol aircraft
during fiscal years 2005–2009. Three of Japan’s four Aegis destroyers will under-
go upgrades to bolster their anti-ballistic-missile capabilities, while two new
Aegis ships will join the fleet over the next decade. These increases will be bal-
anced against efforts to streamline and consolidate the overall fleet, while
growth rates in the annual defense budget will be trimmed. The potential
disjunction between acquisition plans and resources has raised concerns about
feasibility and sustainability.74
The planned construction of a next-generation, 13,500-ton, helicopter-carrying
destroyer signifies a potentially new direction for the MSDF, in which the service
realizes one of its decades-old aspirations. The “16DDH”-class ship has at-
tracted significant media and Diet attention, owing to its resemblance to an air-
craft carrier.75 The vessel’s design features a starboard-side island superstructure
and an uninterrupted flight deck, prompting observers to speculate that Japan
may be eyeing a carrier capable of handling Harrier-like aircraft. Notes one ana-
lyst, “The configuration of the Osumi and the new DDH class indicates that Japan
is rehearsing carrier-building technology to reserve for itself this potential mili-
tary option; and thus, that it is considering discarding the constitutional prohi-
bition on the acquisition of power-projection capabilities.”76
In the meantime, the 16DDH would fulfill many of the peacetime and war-
time missions elaborated in the NDPG.77 As a wartime flagship, the 16DDH
would serve as a command-and-control platform, coordinating the activities of
other units while its organic helicopters conducted ASW operations. During
peacetime operations, or “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), the
16DDH would join the Osumi-class ships for peacekeeping and relief operations,
as well as the “diverse situations” Japan foresees confronting on the high seas.
This array of maritime activities clearly reflects greater confidence on the part
of Japan’s political elite that the MSDF can cope effectively with demanding mis-
sions. The new defense plans also suggest that Japanese power-projection capac-
ity will continue to grow. This convergence of intent and capability could very
well yield a traditional maritime power along the East Asian littoral.
Such a shift would surely have implications for the regional configuration of
power in Northeast Asia and for global security, but several important caveats
are in order. First, Japan’s activism on the high seas today represents the culmi-
nation of gradual, modest steps taken over fifteen years. This long gestation pe-
riod permitted decision makers to ease the prohibitions against overseas
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deployment without unduly alarming government officials or the Japanese elec-
torate. Second, Tokyo’s decisions to employ maritime forces were driven primar-
ily by crisis and, often, by American pressure to act. The Gulf War fiasco
epitomized the highly reactive nature of Japanese decision making. Third, Japan’s
ability to respond to crisis beyond the home islands was largely a by-product of
enhancements to its alliance with the United States. For instance, Japan’s im-
pressive involvement in the war on terror would have been impossible absent the
allied renewal process that began in the mid-1990s. Fourth, at a broader level,
the MSDF largely remains an appendage of American maritime strategy, bereft
of an independent, coherent naval strategy. This situation is acceptable in most
contingencies, when Tokyo can count on support from Washington, but it will
prove problematic if and when Japan needs to act alone.
Finally, Japan’s expansion of the MSDF’s roles and missions does entail strate-
gic risks. The looming consolidation and streamlining of frontline forces suggest
that Japanese political and military leaders believe the MSDF can do more with
less, or at any rate more with the same forces. Such a posture makes eminent sense
if future crises take the form of MOOTW, but this planning parameter assumes
away the potential for higher-intensity confrontations, including traditional
force-on-force engagements on the open seas. This trend is further evidence of
Japan’s break with Mahanian thought since World War II—and it is occurring at a
moment in history when another resurgent military power’s seafaring ambitions
could usher in a new age of Mahan.
CHINA’S RISE: COLLISION COURSE AHEAD?
Sino-Japanese relations have seen better days. Some of the problems that have
ratcheted the two countries’ mutual ambivalence to new highs are perennial fea-
tures of the relationship, while others are new and possibly more difficult to
manage. Among the latter, early signs of maritime competition have appeared in
the past two years. Four nautical issues have dogged bilateral ties: China’s rapid
naval modernization, ongoing cross-strait tensions, boundary and resource dis-
putes in the East China Sea, and incidents at sea. All four problems have followed
patterns that spell trouble for future Sino-Japanese maritime interactions.
In November 2004, for instance, a Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine
intruded into Japanese territorial waters, prompting the JMSDF to track the vessel
and Koizumi’s government to issue a rare public demand for an apology. A newly
revised National Defense Program Outline appeared that same month, declaring
that China’s naval operations required greater vigilance on the MSDF’s part. In
February 2005, Tokyo unexpectedly announced that the Japanese Coast Guard
would formally take charge of a lighthouse erected by nationalists in the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, sparking public protests in China. Beijing has also
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placed on the table objections to Tokyo’s claims to exclusive economic zones sur-
rounding Japanese-owned atolls in the Pacific.78 Similarly, a joint U.S.-Japanese
declaration that the two countries shared “common strategic objectives” in the
Taiwan Strait elicited angry recriminations from Beijing.
Ongoing territorial disputes in the East China Sea resurfaced in the summer
and fall of 2005, after the Japanese government announced that it would grant
certain companies the right to drill for gas deposits in and near contested areas.
When China lodged a protest, Japan accused Beijing of starting extraction oper-
ations. In an unprecedented show of force, China dispatched a naval flotilla led
by Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers to the vicinity of the gas field,
even as negotiators on both sides sought to defuse the situation. A Chinese ship
reportedly trained its guns on a Japanese P-3C patrol aircraft.79 In August the
JDA specifically declared, in its annual defense white paper, that China’s growing
naval power in Asia was a matter of concern.80 Following the release of the white
paper, the head of the JDA, Yoshinori Ohno, averred that Chinese maritime ac-
tivities required attention and called on Beijing to divulge more information
about its military expenditures. The Japanese media subsequently leaked a
highly classified scenario-planning document outlining a robust military strat-
egy for repelling any Chinese invasion of the Senkaku Islands.
Given this escalating set of events, it has become increasingly urgent to discern
how Japanese and Chinese seapower might interact in the future. One useful
method for assessing this Sino-Japanese dynamic is to analyze Chinese strategic
thinking about naval power and compare it against Japan’s approach. Such a com-
parative analysis will hint at strengths and weaknesses in the MSDF’s defense pos-
ture, suggesting whether and how Tokyo ought to realign its priorities.
The disparity between Chinese and Japanese strategic thought about mari-
time affairs could scarcely be sharper. In recent years a vocal school of thought in
Beijing has noticed that Alfred Thayer Mahan’s works furnish both the logic and
the vocabulary with which to argue for assertive seapower.81 Proponents of this
school of thought write and speak in avowedly Mahanian terms, and in many
cases they explicitly cite his works to justify an ambitious maritime strategy. In
particular, his portrayal of seapower as “overbearing power” pervades these Chi-
nese thinkers’ discourse on maritime affairs. Should the Mahanians win out
among the cacophony of voices clamoring for the attention of senior policy
makers in Beijing, Chinese strategy will take on distinctly offensive overtones.82
Japanese strategists and their American partners must remain mindful of this
prospect.
Perhaps the most thoughtful—though by no means the only—spokesman
for China’s Mahanian school is Professor Ni Lexiong of the Research Institute of
War and Culture, Eastern China Science and Engineering University. Professor
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Ni uses seapower theory to evaluate the competing claims of advocates of
seapower and advocates of globalization. The latter, he contends, believe
[that] China should not act by following the traditional sea power theory in pursuing
a strong Navy, because today’s world situation is different from the time of Mahan . . .
that the globalization of the world’s economy has made various countries’ interests
interconnected, mutually dependent on each other to a greater degree, and that if a
country wants to preserve its life line at sea, the only way to do so is to go through
“cooperation” rather than the traditional “solo fight.”83
Globalization theorists, notes Ni, typically urge Beijing to refrain from a na-
val arms buildup. To do so would alert “today’s naval hegemon,” the United
States, “making China’s naval development a self-destructive play with fire,”
reminiscent of imperial Germany’s quixotic bid for seapower at the turn of the
nineteenth century.84
Ni hedges by allowing for the possibility that the world is entering a Kantian
era of perpetual peace, as many globalization enthusiasts maintain, but he pos-
tulates that even a pacific international system will ultimately depend on force.
In either case, then, China should build up its naval forces. If the globalization
theorists have it right, China will need a muscular navy to play its part in the
“world navy,” when one emerges, and to help along the transition to a peaceful
international order. Ni clearly believes, however, that the world has not yet
evolved beyond its Hobbesian state, in which nations must maintain powerful
military forces as a means of self-help. Thus “it is China’s necessary choice to
build up a strong sea power” to guard against “the threats to our ‘outward-leaning
economy’ by some strong nations”—again, code for the United States—in the
lingering “Hobbesian era” he perceives.85
Professor Ni reminds his readers of China’s humiliation at Japanese hands in
1894–95, when a powerful Japanese battle fleet crushed that of the Qing dynasty.
“The key to winning that war was to gain the command of the sea,” he proclaims.
Today’s China should emulate imperial Japan’s example, keeping in mind that
Mahan “believed that whoever could control the sea would win the war and change
history; that command of the sea is achieved through decisive naval battles on the
seas; that the outcome of decisive naval battles is determined by the strength of fire
power on each side of the engagement.”86 This is scarcely the language of someone
predisposed to “protracted defensive resistance,”the term used by some Western an-
alysts to describe China’s naval strategy.87 If indeed this sort of thinking comes to
dominate policy discourse in Beijing, Washington and its Asian partners will be
compelled to come to terms with a newly assertive naval strategy on Beijing’s part. It
behooves Tokyo to relearn its Mahan and to revisit the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
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history, if for no other reason than to get a glimpse into what a prospective competi-
tor may do in maritime East Asia.
What kinds of problems might these trends in Chinese maritime strategy
pose for Japan? Observers in certain quarters of Japan’s strategic community
have begun to grasp the potential Mahanian challenge that Chinese seapower
could present. Studies assessing Chinese maritime intentions and the Sino-Japanese
military balance on the high seas have become more and more common.88 The
Japanese worry that China may be eyeing Japan’s offshore islands as it extends its
naval power eastward. One author cites the creeping expansion of China’s naval
presence in the South China Sea as a worrisome precedent.89 Indeed, some ana-
lysts and authorities in China have hinted subtly at challenging Japan’s legal inter-
pretation of its administrative and sovereign prerogatives in the East China Sea,
including those pertaining to Okinawa. A Japanese commentator alleges that
Beijing harbors hegemonic ambitions to reestablish control over all territories
governed by the Qing dynasty.90
Hideaki Kaneda, a retired JMSDF vice admiral, explicitly links China’s
emerging maritime strategy to Mahan. Kaneda argues that China meets Mahan’s
six tests of seapower, three of which are favorable geography, a large population,
and the national will to compete on the high seas. He observes that the Chinese
are constructing strategic relationships and military bases along the sea lanes
stretching from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf, sea lanes that convey
the energy resources and other commodities that sustain China’s economic
well-being. Under Mahanian logic, this emerging diplomatic and defense infra-
structure (also known as a “string of pearls” ) would permit larger-scale military
deployments in the future to protect Chinese commerce.91 He concludes, “All of
Asia must wake up to the arrival of Chinese-style aggressive ‘sea power.’ Japan, in
particular, must reformulate its national maritime strategy with this in mind.”92
A highly influential journalist, Yoichi Funabashi, implicitly endorses Mahan’s
view that national will is a key determinant of seapower. Despite the nautical
character of Japan’s geography, Funabashi bemoans the Japanese people’s indif-
ference to maritime matters, imploring Japan “to once again devise a maritime
strategy aimed at opening up the four seas that surround it and taking advantage
of the blessings of the oceans.” As for China, he observes, “China is a major con-
tinental power on the rise. By contrast, Japan is expected to show its ‘difference’
and ‘strengths’ as a major maritime power more than ever. It should maintain
‘free navigation’ to build peace and stability in Asia seas and incorporate China
in the framework.”93 Despite his somewhat conciliatory tone, Funabashi insists
that Japan must nurture a national character that embraces maritime power if it
hopes to compete with China on the world stage.
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Jun Kitamura, a Japanese consultant to the U.S. Pacific Command, advocates
a far more bellicose stance vis-à-vis China. He too complains that “Japan lacks a
sense of caution in regard to China’s rapid military expansion.” Pointing to
China’s maturing submarine force, he criticizes the Japanese government for
failing to “fathom the geopolitical significance of the fighting power of sub-
marines in today’s international community.” To remedy the apparent shortfall
in national maritime consciousness, Kitamura urges the Japanese people to “estab-
lish clear national strategies for Japan on their own, and rebuild their military
power as effective means to guarantee the strategies as soon as possible.” Spe-
cifically, he recommends shifting Japan’s line of defense seaward, arguing that
repulsing a direct invasion would be too late and too costly. To support a forward
defense, he says, the JMSDF needs to double in size, acquire a panoply of offen-
sive weaponry, build massive naval bases, and develop its own intelligence infra-
structure. Most controversially, he presses for an alliance with Taiwan that keeps
the island from falling into Chinese hands, thereby safeguarding Japanese sea
lanes adjoining the island.94
Whatever the merits of and differences among these analyses, they all concur
on one important priority: a fundamental reassessment of Japan’s maritime
strategy that helps the JMSDF maintain its edge as China’s naval power grows.
The apparent shift in tone and urgency among these well-respected observers
suggests that a spirited debate about Japan’s maritime posture, harking back to
the Sekino-Kaihara debate, may be in the making. Whether or not Japan’s na-
tional policy and maritime strategy will veer in the direction these commenta-
tors espouse remains to be seen.
In policy terms, the Japanese government has responded concretely to the po-
tential Chinese challenge. Reflecting worries about Beijing’s intentions toward
the offshore islands, the latest defense white paper sets the capacity to stage an
effective response to island invasion as a major priority. Significantly, the report
states, “If there is an indication noticed in advance, an operation shall be con-
ducted to prevent invasion by the enemy’s unit. If there is no indication in ad-
vance and the islands in question were occupied, an operation shall be
conducted to defeat the enemy.”95 For the first time, the Ground SDF forces re-
cently joined the U.S. Marine Corps in joint and combined exercises to defend
offshore islands.96 The Maritime Self-Defense Force would play a central role in
carrying ground troops in such a defensive operation. The JMSDF has also en-
gaged in antisubmarine drills with the U.S. Navy near Okinawan waters.97
A recent study considers how the SDF’s capabilities would measure up against
China’s military in combat over Japan’s offshore islands. The study postulates that
if the Chinese side were able to surprise Japan and rapidly occupy the Sakishima
Islands, the SDF would find it difficult if not impossible to dislodge enemy forces
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on its own. Given the short distances involved, land-based Chinese fighter aircraft
could easily provide protective cover against Japanese forces, while Japanese air-
craft would have much shorter loiter times in the area. The author of the study
concludes that a light aircraft carrier capable of handling vertical/short-takeoff-
and-landing aircraft would be required to counter such an invasion.98 Regardless
of whether this analysis carries any policy weight, the bluntness with which it dis-
cusses a Sino-Japanese confrontation hints at changes in the public mood in Japan
with regard to a Chinese maritime challenge.
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JMSDF
From the foregoing analysis of Japanese strategic thought, it is possible to ven-
ture a few observations and findings.
Applying Strategic Theory Is Tough. Dogmatic adherence to seapower theory
can be harmful if not fatal to maritime nations. So can an indifference to funda-
mental principles of seapower that unmoors strategy and force planning from
any larger sense of national policy and grand strategy. Over the past century, Ja-
pan has exhibited extreme tendencies in both directions. In the case of prewar
Japan, a variant of Mahanian dogma seeped into the Japanese consciousness
about naval power, prodding the IJN leadership into fateful decisions about
force structure and operational doctrine. Today, Japan’s niche—and therefore
highly unbalanced—capabilities and strategy derive from unquestioned as-
sumptions about American security commitments. This could serve Japanese
maritime interests ill over the long run.
China’s Rise Could Portend Trouble. An area that requires further research is
how two differing national approaches to seapower might intersect in practice.
Substantial evidence indicates that Beijing is succumbing to Mahan’s beguiling
logic. If this is so, how will a post-Mahanian JMSDF, unaccustomed to strategic
thought in any of its guises, interact with a Chinese navy that is fascinated with
Mahan? This question has gained substantial policy urgency over the past few
years, as naval rivalry between the two powers has taken hold. Is Japan endanger-
ing itself by directing the MSDF to keep performing its full array of Cold War–
era missions while piling on new international operations, all without boosting
defense spending? How might future acquisitions affect Japan’s maritime secu-
rity? Specifically, would ASW and minesweeping prove adequate in a tilt with
the People’s Liberation Army Navy?
America Needs a More Coherent Naval Strategy. Assuming the United States
wishes to maintain its naval preeminence in Asia indefinitely, it must carefully
reexamine its maritime strategy in the region. Tokyo should urge Washington to
do so, and it should take an active hand in formulating combined strategy. Key
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U.S. policy documents such as “Seapower 21” and the latest Quadrennial De-
fense Review represent sorry excuses for strategy, framed in terms too general
and abstract to provide meaningful guidance. Many Japanese strategic thinkers,
accordingly, have begun reassessing the benefits and costs of a far more inde-
pendent posture in the maritime realm. How would such an outcome benefit or
harm the United States? If American policy makers have thought about this
prospect, they give no sign of it. Washington’s assumption that Tokyo will auto-
matically follow its lead—or, for that matter, Tokyo’s assumption that Washing-
ton will furnish military support even in situations that do not engage U.S.
interests—could engender mutually unrealistic assumptions about the two
partners’ wills and capabilities, especially in times of crisis or war. Suppose the
United States decided that a Chinese invasion of Japan’s offshore islands fell out-
side of the purview of the defense treaty. What then for the JMSDF?
Japan Needs a Theorist. It behooves the policy community in Tokyo to start
thinking ahead now about how Japan should handle contingencies that threaten
to strain the security alliance or leave the United States standing on the sidelines.
If Alfred Thayer Mahan is no longer a useful guide to Japanese maritime strat-
egy, who is? Julian Corbett’s writings offer a good starting point for this sorely
needed debate and for a broader renaissance of strategic thought in Japan.
Corbett fits better with contemporary Japanese political and strategic culture
than does Mahan. He favored big ideas, not technical details or specific weapons
systems; he was not a blue-water theorist to the same degree as Mahan; his vision
was not universalist like that of Mahan but admitted of regional strategies such
as Japan’s; and he was not fixated on absolute victory at sea. Rather, Corbett held
out the possibility of limited naval operations aimed at limited political and
strategic objectives—a trait that could endear him to a Japanese populace and
government still averse to the use of force. And, like today’s MSDF leadership, he
depicted controlling maritime communications as the foremost challenge fac-
ing practitioners of naval operations.99
In short, Corbett’s works offer a promising platform for strategic discussions.
Japan needs to resurrect its tradition of strategic thinking about the sea. Let the
debate begin.
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